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“We are removing the incentive that personal injury trial lawyers 
have to file frivolous lawsuits and run health care professionals out of 
business.”1 
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1 James Richard “Rick” Perry, Governor, Tex., Gov. Perry Speaks at Med Mal 
Bill Signing (July 11, 2003), http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/govdocs/Rick%20 
Perry/2003/speech071103.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Why Texas? 
he words above are those of Texas governor Rick Perry at the 
2003 signing ceremony for a tort reform measure that placed a 
damage cap on noneconomic damages in health care cases (i.e., 
medical malpractice and nursing home cases).2 Why open an article 
for a symposium on the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Horton 
v. Oregon Health Science University3 with Perry’s statement? That 
decision, like Perry’s statement, deals with damage caps. If we look 
past the political rhetoric about frivolous lawsuits and running health 
care professionals out of business, Perry’s statement alludes to a very 
important issue relevant to the discussion in Oregon about damage 
caps—one not directly addressed in Horton. That issue is access to 
justice—or we should say, meaningful access to the rights and 
remedies the law provides. 
In overruling two earlier decisions on state constitutional grounds 
in Horton, the Oregon Supreme Court opened the door for damage 
caps in the state. The court’s decision dealt specifically with a damage 
cap in a case involving a state employee and a state entity. However, 
the breadth of the ruling’s reach, it is fair to say, was left open with 
respect to caps generally. The court expressed no opinion about the 
constitutionality of damage caps in a situation unlike the one in 
Horton. In his opinion, Justice Kistler said, with regard to caps and 
the Oregon Constitution’s remedy clause, “[t]hose cases are not 
before us, and we leave their resolution to the customary process of 
case-by-case adjudication.”4 The discussion, in other words, will 
continue. 
Governor Perry, in contrast, signed a piece of legislation duly 
passed by the Texas Legislature in 2003. The law imposed a hard 
damage cap (one not periodically adjusting for inflation) on 
noneconomic damages awards in a specific type of case.5 Perry and 
the Texas Legislature had no state constitutional issues to worry 
about. Any such issues were efficiently swept away later that year by 
a controversial statewide referendum amending the Texas 
 
2 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301(a)–(c) (West 2017). As shorthand, we 
will use the term “medical malpractice” as including both medical malpractice and nursing 
home cases. 
3 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
4 Id. at 225, 376 P.3d at 1030. 
5 § 74.301(a)–(c). 
T
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Constitution.6 The amendment specifically allows damage caps, and 
importantly, it allows them “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
this constitution.”7 
On its face, the legislation Perry praised does not bar medical 
malpractice suits, nor does it thwart formal access. However, the 
essence of his message is found in the reference to plaintiffs’ lawyers 
and their “incentives,” and what that message implies with regard to 
meaningful, worthwhile access to a legal remedy. Perry’s targeting of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers is significant because they are the civil justice 
system’s gatekeepers. They open the doors to the courthouse—or not. 
The doors will remain closed to many plaintiffs if the gatekeepers 
cannot play the role profitably. Changing the incentive structure is 
intended to ensure they cannot play that role profitably.8 
Meaningful access, as opposed to formal access, requires a lawyer. 
In complex cases, such as malpractice matters, it is important to have 
a lawyer who has experience with this type of matter and the 
resources to handle it.9 Such lawyers hold the key to the courthouse 
door because they provide meaningful access. Without lawyers 
willing and able to take on costly, complex cases, many plaintiffs are 
left without viable access to a real remedy. A layperson has no chance 
for success in a pro se proceeding. As one Texas trial court judge 
stated with regard to medical malpractice cases, “they won’t be able 
to come to the courthouse because they can’t litigate them 
 
6 See H.J. Res. 3, 78th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 
66(b); Bill Kidd, Proposition 12 Appears to be Most Controversial Amendment, TEMPLE 
DAILY TEL. (July 27, 2003), http://www.tdtnews.com/archive/article_d1d015c9-8f71-5b 
3c-b79c-6c07d2d2e6da.html. 
7 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66. 
8 On the idea of lawyers as gatekeepers, see HERBERT JACOB, LAW AND POLITICS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 118 (2d ed. 1986); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee 
Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997); Joanne 
Martin & Stephen Daniels, Access Denied, TRIAL, July 1997, at 26. For a practitioner’s 
perspective, see Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the 
Courthouse Door, 2 LITIG. 27 (1976). 
9 Even in simpler cases representation is a necessity. A recent Denver Post article 
reported on an examination of legal representation—or the lack thereof—in housing court. 
It shows in such cases a party’s chance of any success without representation is virtually 
nil. See Jennifer Brown, Denver Landlords Tried to Evict Nearly 8,000 Households Last 
Year. The Success Rate Largely Depended on One Factor: Attorneys, DENV. POST (Sept. 
15, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/09/13/eviction-denver-renters         
-tenants-landlords-more-success-with-attorney/. On the importance of representation in 
medical malpractice cases, see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 
Specialization, and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1055–60 (2006). 
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themselves, that’s impossible. I’ve seen a few pro se litigants; it just 
can’t be done.”10 
B. Texas—Because Access Depends on the Contingency Fee 
Perry’s statement reflects a sophisticated understanding of the 
connection between the business side of plaintiffs’ practice and 
access. It recognizes the importance of meaningful access and that it 
is not free. It is not free because lawyers—the gatekeepers—need to 
be paid; they need to pay their operating costs and make a living. 
Perry’s statement also recognizes the fact that many, if not most, 
injury victims—especially where medical malpractice is involved—
cannot pay a lawyer on an hourly basis while also paying the 
litigation costs. The only option available for most injured people to 
afford meaningful representation is to find a lawyer who will handle 
the case on a contingency fee basis. 
In short, Perry’s statement illustrates that the contingency fee—in 
practice—is about access to the full range of rights and remedies the 
law provides for those without the means to pay a lawyer to represent 
them. Professor Herbert Kritzer notes that, “from the perspective of 
the average citizen, contingency fees are about ‘access to justice’ 
through the mechanism of civil litigation, or the threat of civil 
litigation.”11 What Perry is celebrating, in pointing to the demise of 
incentives, is that damage caps will make medical malpractice cases 
so financially unattractive that plaintiffs’ lawyers—particularly the 
specialists who have built their practices on these cases—will not 
handle them. 
Perry’s statement recognizes the fact that lawyers working on a 
contingency fee basis must balance cost, risk, and reward across a 
practice’s portfolio of cases if they are to stay in business.12 They 
must choose cases carefully because if they lose, they receive nothing 
for their time and no reimbursement for the costs of the case. Adding 
damage caps changes that balancing, perhaps fundamentally if the cap 
 
10 See discussion infra Part I for an overview of our Texas research. Stephen Daniels & 
Joanne Martin, American Bar Foundation Texas Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Project (2006) 
(materials on file with the authors). Unless otherwise specifically footnoted with a citation, 
all quotations in our article come from lawyers or judges we interviewed as a part of our 
research. Human subjects regulations and promises of confidentiality prevent us from 
identifying them or presenting them in way that would allow them to be identified. 
11 HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (2004). 
12 See id. at 9–19. We rely heavily on Kritzer’s insight throughout our discussion. 
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is set low. It does so because caps, in limiting damages, are 
functionally a limit on the contingency fee. Lawyers must factor this 
into their choice of cases, and limiting fees can limit meaningful 
access as lawyers decide what cases to take. Limiting damages in 
risky, expensive to prepare cases like medical malpractice is also a 
good way to curtail legal scrutiny. 
In changing the incentive structure, the gatekeepers are clearly the 
immediate targets. However, we must keep in mind that they are not 
the ones who will really feel the pain. A plaintiffs’ lawyer, 
interviewed as a part of our research in Texas, told us, “I wanna make 
sure that I’m clear about one thing, and that is the real victim in all of 
this is the consumer, the individual. It’s not the lawyers . . . we’re all 
fairly well educated and we’re resourceful enough to come up with 
other ways to pay our bills and feed our families. And although our 
lifestyles may have taken a hit, we’re not the victims in this.”13 
It is the effect of damage caps on meaningful access we will 
discuss here. We have been doing research in Texas on tort reform—
including medical malpractice—and the idea of lawyers as 
gatekeepers, and our article draws from that work. Our research and 
its lessons offer a cautionary tale about damage caps, and those 
lessons can inform the discussion on damage caps in Oregon. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides a short 
outline of our Texas research. Part II offers a brief overview of tort 
reform—including medical malpractice—with an emphasis on Texas. 
It provides a bit of needed context. Part III, a more substantive 
section, discusses the idea of plaintiffs’ lawyers as gatekeepers and 
describes their business model, which is necessary for understanding 
the relationship between damage caps and access. This is followed by 
Part IV, a discussion of the case screening process. It is here, in how 
plaintiff’s lawyers decide what cases to take and why, we see the 
practical connection between damage caps and meaningful access. 
Lastly, Part V addresses the question of whether the gates to the 
courthouse are narrowing, or even closing altogether for some injured 
people in the wake of damage caps. 
I 
SO, WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TEXAS? 
So, what do we—the authors—know about Texas, and how do we 
know it? The lessons from Texas offering a cautionary tale for 
 
13 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
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Oregon arise out of our research on plaintiffs’ lawyers, their roles, the 
effects of tort reform on them, and ultimately the effects on access. 
Our research is an amalgam of a multifaceted series of research 
projects begun in the mid-1990s and that continue today. This 
research allowed us to systematically examine the Texas plaintiffs’ 
bar and lawyers’ practices along with changes in those practices as 
tort reform unfolded and progressed.14 In saying “as tort reform 
unfolded,” we mean to say that our research was framed by the 
politics of tort reform in Texas. Tort reform has been a key part of the 
rise of the Republican Party in Texas and its eventual capture of all 
branches of state government in the early 2000s.15 
Anchoring our research are two key sources of information. The 
first comes from in-depth interviews with Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers—
100 completed between 1995 and 2000, 51 undertaken in 2005–06, 
and 5 done in 2012–13. These interviews captured comments and 
insights from plaintiffs’ lawyers across the state. The interviews 
focused on lawyers’ practices and their views on tort reform and the 
changing environment in which they work. A number of these 
lawyers were interviewed more than once at different points in time 
over the course of our research. 
The second key source of information comes from two detailed 
surveys of Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers. One was fielded in 2000 and the 
other in 2006. Each survey was sent to a statewide sample of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers (lawyers with at least twenty-five percent of their 
business in contingency fee cases) and each involved a different 
sample of respondents. Like the interviews, the surveys focused on 
eliciting information about lawyers’ practices and their views on tort 
reform and its effects. Because we wanted to explore changes in 
lawyers’ practices generally, the surveys included a number of 
questions in common. But even though different samples were used, 
there were a number of lawyers who appeared in both samples and 
completed both surveys—the “repeaters.” For this unique set of 
lawyers we can actually look at changes in individual practices. 
We will draw from these sources in our discussion here, with 
special attention to the interviews. Sometimes the best approach is to 
 
14 We have written widely on the subjects of tort reform, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and access 
to the courts. Most recently, Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Where Have All the Cases 
Gone? The Strange Success of Tort Reform Revisited, 65 EMORY L.J. 1445 (2016); 
STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, TORT REFORM, PLAINTIFFS’ LAWYERS, AND 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2015). 
15 See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 31–69. 
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simply let the research subjects speak for themselves, and given the 
ways in which damage caps affect access, this is one of those times. 
Too much is lost in trying to merely summarize the balancing of the 
multifaceted factors that may open the courthouse door—or not.16 
II 
REFORM, DAMAGE CAPS, AND TEXAS 
Concerns over medical malpractice litigation are a mainstay in the 
contemporary tort reform movement, but general concerns around 
medical malpractice have a very long history in the United States. The 
title of a 1990 book by historian Kenneth Allen DeVille—Medical 
Malpractice in Nineteenth Century America—itself illustrates this.17 
The contemporary concerns related to litigation, however, date to the 
1970s, and those concerns brought the first of a series of state 
legislative efforts to change the rules surrounding medical 
malpractice. These efforts eventually became a part of a larger 
political movement for tort reform. 
It is important in examining the various aspects of tort reform, like 
damage caps, to keep in mind that the movement is and has always 
been deeply political in nature. One of the most cogent definitions of 
politics is “who gets what, when, how.”18 Tort reform has always 
been about whose interests the law will serve.19 Writing over thirty 
years ago, Kenneth Jost, then the editor of the Los Angeles Daily 
Journal (a legal newspaper), stated the following, “[t]he current tort 
reform movement seeks not neutral efficiency-enhancing procedural 
 
16 See id. at 241–45 for the technical details of our research methodology. In brief, we 
chose Texas as a research site because Texas has a substantial, long-standing, and 
differentiated plaintiffs’ bar. It has experienced a forty-year history of increasingly intense 
tort reform activity that includes legislative actions and court decisions as well as lobbying 
efforts and public relations campaigns on the part of interest groups with national ties. 
Finally, Texas became the poster child for tort reform “success.” See id. at 31–69. 
17 Many of the major themes found in today’s debates over medical malpractice appear 
in his book—the fear and aggravation of malpractice suits, seen as frivolous; the idea of 
over litigiousness in this area; the idea that things are so bad that nearly every physician 
has been the victim of such suits brought by unsavory lawyers; and even the idea that the 
situation is driving doctors out of business and thereby threatening the availability and 
adequacy of health care services. KENNETH ALLEN DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1990). Turning to Governor Perry, “Because of the 
[2003] medical malpractice reforms . . . our hospitals and clinics will remain open to the 
patients who need them.” Perry, supra note 1. 
18 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1st ed. 1936). 
19 On the politics, see DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 2–30; see also WILLIAM 
HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE 
LITIGATION CRISIS (2004). 
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changes, but substantive legal revision to rewrite rules more in their 
[the reformers’] favor.”20 
The politics surrounding tort reform have become increasingly 
partisan. Writing in 2002, political scientist Thomas Burke noted the 
politics of tort reform are relatively straightforward. He said, “Groups 
aligned with plaintiffs fight groups aligned with the defendants . . . . 
[The] battles are thus highly partisan, with most Republicans on the 
antilitigation side and most Democrats lined up with the plaintiffs.”21 
This polarization along party lines is clearly observed in Texas, and 
Perry’s statement at the opening of our Article is simply one 
illustration. Other influential factors include the role of trade groups 
and lobbying organizations like the American Tort Reform 
Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal 
Reform along with their state and local affiliates. Such groups have 
been, and continue to be, active in Texas. 
Burke identified three waves, or rounds, of tort reform—in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. A fourth round subsequently occurred in the 
early to mid-2000s, after Burke’s initial observations.22 The impetus 
for the first round in the 1970s, Burke notes, was medical malpractice 
itself—and damage caps were a key aspect of this early effort. He 
found that “[b]etween 1975 and 1978, fourteen states . . . put 
monetary caps on damages,” among other changes.23 Most measures 
placed limits on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases 
ranging from $250,000 to $1,000,000. The State of Indiana took a 
different approach during this first wave and placed a cap on all 
damages in medical malpractice cases. In the estimation of one 
commentator reviewing these early activities, damage caps were 
among the most significant changes.24 
Texas was among those states placing caps on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases.25 The Texas cap, however, 
was struck down by the Texas Supreme Court on state constitutional 
grounds in 1988. Specifically, the Texas court decided the cap 
 
20 Kenneth Jost, Polemics Won’t Solve Insurance Crisis, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 9, 1985, at 
2. 
21 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 27 (2002). 
22 Id. at 31–32. 
23 Id. 
24 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further 
Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 525 (1989). 
25 See Michael D. Morrison, Texas Tort Law−2003: It Was a Very ___ Year, 56 
BAYLOR L. REV. 423, 453–55 (2004). 
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violates article 1, section 13, of the Texas Constitution. “All courts 
shall be open, and every person for an injury done to him, in his 
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course 
of law.”26 This decision, in turn, was later rendered moot by the 2003 
voter-approved constitutional amendment. As we noted earlier, the 
amendment specifically allows damage caps, and importantly, it 
allows them “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this 
constitution.”27 
The second nation-wide wave of “tort reform” began in the mid-
1980s, and Burke notes this round covered more than just medical 
malpractice claims.28 Damage caps were featured yet again, and not 
just for medical malpractice cases. “Between 1985 and 1988 sixteen 
[states] capped ‘pain and suffering’ damages. . . . In 1986 alone, 
forty-one of the forty-six legislatures that met passed some type of 
tort reform.”29 Oregon was among those sixteen states and passed 
legislation limiting noneconomic damages. The Oregon Supreme 
Court subsequently declared the cap unconstitutional on state 
constitutional grounds.30 However, the court later overruled these 
cases in Horton, apparently allowing caps again.31 
The third wave of tort reform on a national level arrived in the mid-
1990s, again involving a broad range of issues and not just medical 
malpractice. As recorded by Burke, “In 1995 eighteen states passed 
tort reforms, including extensive reform packages in Oklahoma, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Texas. Between 1995 and 1997 fourteen states 
limited punitive damages, thirteen modified their joint and several 
liability rules, and eight made significant changes in products liability 
law.”32 In Texas, medical malpractice was again included, imposing 
strict filing requirements, including a $5000 bond for each defendant 
named, along with new qualifications for experts.33 
The fourth wave of tort reform came in the early 2000s, this time 
with more emphasis on medical malpractice. Among the states 
 
26 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W. 2d 687, 696 (Tex. 1988). 
27 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b). 
28 BURKE, supra note 21, at 32. 
29 Id. 
30 See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 86, 23 P.3d 333, 336 (2001), 
overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016); Lakin 
v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 67, 987 P.2d 463, 467, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 P.2d 
476 (1999), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998. 
31 Horton, 359 Or. at 254, 376 P.3d at 1046. 
32 BURKE, supra note 21, at 32. 
33 See Frank L. Branson, Personal Torts, 49 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1241 (1996). 
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implementing major medical malpractice reforms, were Texas (the 
2003 legislation), Illinois, and Florida.34 A key provision of the 
reforms in each of the aforementioned states was a stringent cap on 
damages. The damage caps in Florida and Illinois were subsequently 
struck down on state constitutional grounds.35 As previously 
mentioned, as a result of the 2003 voter-approved amendment, 
constitutional issues in Texas were no longer relevant. 
In Texas, Governor Perry made medical malpractice reform—and 
targeting plaintiffs’ lawyers—a major policy goal for Republicans 
during the 2003 legislative session. According to a Texas Lawyer 
overview of his agenda, a Perry spokesman said, “[t]he Governor 
believes med-mal reform is the key to reducing skyrocketing 
insurance rates for medical doctors . . . [and] also says that frivolous 
litigation is the reason for the premium increases.”36 The overview 
also noted the focus on plaintiffs’ lawyers, stating the Governor’s 
agenda “takes aim at the plaintiffs’ lawyers—a group that will 
assuredly take plenty of hits from the Republican-controlled, tort-
reform minded Texas Legislature.”37 The key provision of the 
governor’s reform agenda was a $250,000 cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases.38 
That 2003 amendment referendum was a blunt, but very effective, 
mechanism for clearing away any state constitutional barriers to 
damage caps, and it was quite controversial.39 Perhaps the most 
important opponent of the amendment was Deborah Hankinson, a 
Republican and former Texas Supreme Court Justice originally 
appointed to the court by then-Governor George W. Bush. Although 
an earlier supporter of tort reform, she became a key fundraiser, 
 
34 See Joseph Falk, Comment, Resuscitating Noneconomic Medical Malpractice 
Damage Caps in Illinois, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 185, 185–86 (2014); R. Jason Richards, 
Capping Non-Economic Medical Malpractice Damages: How the Florida Supreme Court 
Should Decide the Issue, 42 STETSON L. REV. 113, 115–16 (2012); see also Morrison, 
supra note 25. 
35 See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014); Lebron v. Gottlieb 
Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). 
36 Lisa Whitley, 2003 Legislative Wish List, TEX. LAW., http://www.texaslawyer.com 
/id=900005379491 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
37 See id. It is worth noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers were not among Perry’s or the 
Republican’s supporters. 
38 See Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Foreword, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 729, 729 (2005) 
(Foreword to House Bill 4 Symposium Issue of Texas Law Review) for a basic overview of 
the 2003 legislation. He described the legislation as “among the most sweeping statutes the 
legislature has ever enacted.” Id. 
39 See Kidd, supra note 6. 
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spokesperson, and the treasurer for the major opposition group, Save 
Texas Courts. She was joined in her work with this group by another 
former Texas Supreme Court justice and Bush appointee—Republican 
James A. Baker.40 
Given the significant issues at stake, Hankinson was troubled by 
the entire process. For her, the tort reform package and the 
authorization for the amendment’s special election “went through the 
Texas Legislature with very little comment.”41 Most important for 
Hankinson, however, was the amendment’s substance and what it 
would mean in practice.42 Her concern was about the effects on 
access to the courts (the purpose of article 1, section 13, of the Texas 
Constitution).43 According to Hankinson, the proposed amendment 
and any subsequent legislation “would be closing the doors to a great 
many citizens.”44 
In 2005, Hankinson told a journalist, “this amendment . . . wasn’t 
designed to cut off bad—that is, frivolous—lawsuits; it was designed 
to cut off lawsuits by people with legitimate claims, by restricting 
access to the courthouse . . . [t]his tort reform went too far . . . I view 
this as something that deprives people of their constitutional rights.”45 
Former Justice Baker agreed, arguing that the reformers had gone too 
far in allowing the legislature to limit damages. It would, in his view, 
 
40 See Mary Alice Robbins, Big Names, Big Change: First Shot Fired Over Proposed 
Constitutional Amendment to Cap Damages, TEX. LAW., July 7, 2003, at 1. 
41 Am. Bar Found., The Fellows CLE Seminar: The Juice Isn’t Worth the Squeeze: The 
Impact of Tort Reform on Plaintiffs’ Lawyers and Access to Justice, 24 RESEARCHING 
LAW, Spring 2013, at 7 (2013). The Fellows CLE Seminar article reported at length on a 
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation CLE Research Seminar, which was held on 
February 9, 2013 in Dallas, TX, during the 2013 American Bar Association Midyear 
Meeting. Drawing from a verbatim transcript of the CLE, it included details on the 
panelists’ respective presentations and comments (see American Bar Foundation, Fellows 
CLE Research Seminar, February 9, 2013, on file with the authors). The panelists were 
Professor Stephen Daniels, former Texas Supreme Court Justice Deborah Hankinson, 
Professor Ellen Pryor, Professor Charles Silver, and attorney Carmen Mitchell. Legal 
journalist Mark Curriden was the panel moderator. 
42 Id. at 7–8. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 8. Hankinson found the date for the election especially troubling—“the first 
Saturday after Labor Day.” Id. at 7. As a special election, she noted, turnout was likely to 
be low compared to the already scheduled November election in which “there were going 
to be some significant local elections in places like Houston that would’ve very much 
affected voter turnout.” Id. 
45 Mimi Swartz, Hurt? Injured? Need a Lawyer? Too Bad!, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 
2005), www.texasmonthly.com/content/hurt-injured-need-lawyer-too-bad. 
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undermine the rights the framers of the Texas Constitution provided 
to citizens to have their disputes fully heard by the courts.46 
III 
GATEKEEPING AND THE BUSINESS MODEL 
A. Gatekeeping 
What motivated two tort reform-supporting Republicans, such as 
Justices Hankinson and Baker, to express their opposition in the face 
of a measure deeply rooted in a major issue at the heart of the 
Republican agenda in Texas and one heavily touted by the Republican 
governor? Their concern should tell us something deeply important is 
at stake here beyond the partisan debates that have surrounded tort 
reform. 
What motivates them is preserving the role of the gatekeepers and 
protecting against the loss of meaningful access. As experienced 
litigators who also served for years on the bench, they understand the 
practical importance of representation. In our view, this is an issue 
often lost in the political debates over the advisability and efficacy of 
reform measures, like damage caps. The rhetorical claims in the 
political debate favoring caps focus on keeping doctors in the state, 
lowering their insurance premiums, and improving health care. 
These are precisely the issues to which Perry pointed in his 2003 
signing statement for the Texas legislation enacting the cap. Because 
of malpractice reforms, he said, “our hospitals and clinics will remain 
open to the patients who need them . . . . By capping non-economic 
damages . . . we are taking strong action to lower malpractice 
insurance rates and keep doctors, nurses, and hospitals doing what 
they do best: providing health care to Texans in need.”47 These are 
the kinds of matters—ones tied to availability of health care—Justice 
Kistler might see as the quid pro quo, or trade-offs, justifying caps—
lower awards for some people that in turn benefit the people of 
Oregon generally.48 For Hankinson and Baker, lower awards for some 
people are not the issue. It is the practical inability to get any award. 
 
46 See Robbins, supra note 40. 
47 Perry, supra note 1. 
48 Said Justice Kistler, 
[T]he court has recognized that the reasons for the legislature’s actions can 
matter. For example, when the legislature has sought to adjust a person’s rights 
and remedies as part of a larger statutory scheme that extends benefits to some 
while limiting benefits to others, we have considered that quid pro quo in 
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As noted at the outset, the Texas legislation does not bar medical 
malpractice suits, nor does it thwart formal access to the courthouse. 
It is meaningful access that is at stake, and this requires not just any 
lawyer, but one who has the experience and the resources to pursue a 
matter like medical malpractice. Without lawyers willing and able to 
take on these cases, plaintiffs are left with the window dressing of 
rights with no real world worth. As one Texas lawyer bluntly told us 
in one of our research interviews, “Unless there’s a way to make 
money practicing law, rights don’t make any difference.”49 
A study by law professors Charles Silver and David Hyman 
provides a simple Texas illustration. Using publicly available data on 
closed Texas insurance claims for bodily injury, Silver and Hyman 
found that across all lines of commercial liability insurance, claimants 
with lawyers received higher payments.50 This finding is consistent 
with those we reported in an earlier article about medical malpractice 
matters in Wisconsin.51 Parties without legal representation almost 
never received an award regardless of the merits of their case, while 
those with representation were more likely to receive an award. Those 
represented by the best lawyers—the medical malpractice 
specialists—were the most likely to receive an award (and receive the 
highest awards).52 A recent article on plaintiffs’ lawyers and medical 
malpractice litigation in Illinois came to the same conclusions.53 
Again, the only way for most people to afford representation, 
especially in a complex matter such as medical malpractice, is to hire 
a lawyer who will handle that matter on a contingency fee basis. The 
 
determining whether the reduced benefit that the legislature has provided an 
individual plaintiff is “substantial” in light of the overall statutory scheme. 
Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 219, 376 P.3d 998, 1027 (2016). 
Interestingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly rejected this kind of justification for  
a cap. See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 491 (Wis. 2005). A 
Wisconsin appellate court recently reiterated the Ferdon reasoning in striking a subsequent 
cap passed by the state legislature. See also Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families 
Comp. Fund, 901 N.W. 2d 782, 794 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017). 
49 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10 on our research interviews and 
citation. 
50 Charles Silver & David A. Hyman, Access to Justice in a World without Lawyers: 
Evidence from Texas Bodily Injury Claims, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 364 (2010). 
51 Daniels & Martin, supra note 9. 
52 Id.; see also Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and 
Strategic Advantage in Medical Malpractice Claims (Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 
9210) (1992). 
53 David A. Hyman et al., Medical Malpractice Litigation and the Market for Plaintiff-
Side Representation: Evidence from Illinois, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 603 (2016). 
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costs of handling these types of cases are far too great, often six 
figures to cover investigation, experts, depositions, and the other costs 
of litigation. Even the cost of the required bond for each named 
defendant would be an insurmountable barrier for most plaintiffs to 
face alone. To illustrate, one experienced medical malpractice 
litigator told us, “I think the most I’ve had [invested in a medical 
malpractice case] was around $600,000 or $700,000. We prevailed on 
that one, thank goodness.”54 
In summarizing the importance of the contingency fee arrangement 
for access, a different Texas lawyer we interviewed explained, 
ninety percent of the people out there make their living, they pay for 
their kids to go to school, they pay to take care of their kids, they 
pay for their mortgage, they pay for their one or two cars, and at the 
end of the month, they may have $100 left over if they’re the lucky 
ones. . . . And so, for someone to have the ability to go hire a lawyer 
on anything other than a contingency, you know, I think it’s a 
fiction.55 
Another lawyer said, it “is a shame for most of the people out there 
who just—they just can’t hire a lawyer on an hourly basis and you’ve 
got no ability to get anybody to represent you because you have no 
money . . . You know, it closes the door to a lotta people out there.”56 
What if there were no lawyers willing and able to work on a 
contingency fee basis? The lawyer just quoted about closing the door 
provided a stark illustration regarding damage caps and access in the 
city in which he practiced at the time. 
 You won’t find any nursing home lawyers anymore [post-2003 
cap]. If they claim to be a nursing home specialist or malpractice 
specialists and do only malpractice, it’s because they have the 
ability to practice in a different state . . . Because there’s no money 
to be made in Texas in those areas. One of the biggest in town . . . 
who did a ton of nursing home, and now he’s working for a defense 
firm because he had no ability to continue making money in that 
practice area. And that’s what I think that you can see happening in 
the future. They will leave the area, they will leave the practice 
area, or they’ll just slowly suffocate because they have no money, 
there’s no money coming in, if they stay in that practice area.57 
This lawyer ultimately left the practice area. 
 
54 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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As Silver and Hyman note, “[t]ort reforms can cause the supply of 
legal services to contract by capping fees, reducing claim values, or 
making litigation riskier or more expensive for claimants.”58 
Hankinson and Baker understand this as well, and it is why they were 
so concerned about meaningful access in the wake of tort reform in 
Texas. 
B. The Business Model and the Plaintiffs’ Bar 
The contingency fee is a mechanism designed to enable access to 
legal remedies for people without substantial means, but it is not a 
perfect answer to the problem of access. A key reason it is a less than 
perfect answer is the business model for plaintiffs’ lawyers who build 
most—if not all—of their practice around the representation of people 
injured in some way. A business model based on contingency fees is 
unlike the traditional hourly fee model. As noted earlier, the lawyer 
receives no fee unless there is a monetary settlement or award for the 
client, nor will the lawyer receive reimbursement for the costs 
incurred in handling the case. These are the inherent, baseline risks 
for many plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
The contingency fee business model shapes a lawyer’s practice and 
the plaintiffs’ bar in important ways—ways that affect how, and even 
if, they can play the gatekeeping role we have emphasized in the 
discussion so far. The lawyer must, to a substantial degree, be a 
rational business actor.59 Given the inherent risks, the lawyer needs to 
pay close attention to costs and overhead. Because a practice based on 
contingency fees is often characterized by a series of one-time clients, 
 
58 Silver & Hyman, supra note 50, at 380. 
59 While the lawyer needs to be a rational actor to a substantial degree, in Texas we 
found that this was not sufficient to fully understand the plaintiffs’ bar. We found more 
involved than just making a living. One Texas plaintiffs’ lawyer told us: 
You have true believers . . . . I put myself in that category. What has appealed to 
me is a family with kids whose life gets turned upside down because someone in 
the family gets seriously hurt or killed, and they’re facing a greater than David 
and Goliath battle, and they need someone to fight for them . . . . I’ll be in this 
business until the bitter end. And I hope that the bitter end is not five years from 
now. 
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at xvii. For many plaintiffs’ lawyers there is a very 
particular professional identity or sense of what its means to be this kind of lawyer, their 
own set of norms, and their own professional organizations. If these lawyers were purely 
rational actors, we might legitimately wonder why they ever decided to enter this practice 
area and why—in the face of tort reform in Texas—anyone would stay in it. See id. at 
106–39 for a discussion of their professional identity and norms, and at 71–105 for a 
discussion of the development of the Texas plaintiffs’ bar and organizations. 
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the lawyer also needs a steady stream of clients with injuries or losses 
the civil justice system will compensate adequately. This means 
sufficient to compensate the client, cover the lawyer’s costs, and 
provide a fee. Accordingly, a damage cap, depending on the 
additional risk and cost involved, may cause lawyers to be leery of 
cases covered by the cap. One can see, as we noted earlier, why 
Hankinson and Baker would be concerned about access. 
Governor Perry’s remarks that opened this Article presume that 
there is, in fact, a particular set of lawyers at fault for serious harms 
threatening the people of Texas. Leaving aside his rhetorical claims 
about those harms, he was right. In Texas, we found that there is a 
coherent, robust plaintiffs’ bar with its own history, professional 
organizations, and a clear hierarchy. It is made up of lawyers whose 
practices consist almost exclusively of plaintiffs’ work done on a 
contingency fee basis.60 Across the pool of the respondents to the 
second of our two surveys (conducted in 2006), the median 
percentage of caseload representing cases taken on a contingency fee 
basis was seventy-five percent and the mean was ninty-five percent.61 
Plaintiffs’ practices in Texas are small in terms of the size of their 
firms; eighty-five percent of our survey respondents worked as solos 
or in firms of two to five lawyers.62 With the exception of the few, 
but very visible, lawyers with high-volume television advertising-
based practices or mass tort lawyers, Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers also 
tend to have small support staffs. One would expect small size, as 
those firms must keep overhead as low as possible due to the risks 
 
60 Over one-third of our respondents are board certified in personal injury, in civil trial 
law, or both. The Texas Board of Legal Specialization enforces substantial requirements 
for certification. See STATE BAR OF TEX., STATE BAR OF TEXAS MEMBERSHIP: 
ATTORNEY STATISTICAL PROFILE (2005-2006) 4 (2006), https://www.texasbar.com/AM 
/Template.cfm?Section=Archives&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1145
7. At the time of our survey the State Bar of Texas reported that only ten percent of all 
Texas attorneys were formally certified in one or more of twenty different practice areas. 
Id. Less than six percent of all Texas lawyers at the time were certified in personal injury 
trial law or civil trial law (these figures include lawyers working in the defense side). Id. 
61 In contrast, the comparable figures for all lawyers in private practice in Texas were 
two percent and nineteen percent. The statistics for all private practice lawyers in Texas 
were taken from the authors’ analysis of data from the State Bar of Texas, Texas Referral 
Practices Survey Report. STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS REFERRAL PRACTICES SURVEY 
(2004), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Archives&Template=/CM 
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11493. 
62 According to the State Bar of Texas, the comparable figure for all Texas private 
practitioners in 2005-2006 was fifty-nine percent. See STATE BAR OF TEX., supra note 60 
at 2. 
DANIELS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018  12:10 PM 
2018] Damage Caps and Access to Justice: Lessons from Texas 651 
involved and the concomitant cash-flow concerns that come with 
needing to fund cases. 
For most plaintiffs’ lawyers, caseloads are generally small and are 
dominated by lower-value automobile accident cases.63 For thirty-
eight percent of the survey respondents, automobile accident cases 
made up fifty percent or more of their business, and only twenty-five 
percent said they handled no automobile accident cases.64 These cases 
represent frequently occurring events that typically do not involve a 
large upfront investment to handle. And a larger caseload of even less 
costly matters would mean higher overhead to handle the cases. 
In contrast, medical malpractice and nursing home cases, on 
average, make up just twelve percent of the caseloads of the survey 
respondents.65 Fifty-nine percent of them, however, reported handling 
none of these specialized types of cases and only nine percent 
reported that medical malpractice or nursing home cases made up 
fifty percent or more of their business.66 These lawyers, in effect, are 
“super specialists.” They are the ones with the expertise and resources 
to handle medical malpractice cases and the ones for whom the 
damage cap poses the greatest threat, but the cap also affects other 
plaintiffs’ lawyers as we will we see below. 
In line with the dominance of lower-value automobile cases, the 
median value of cases handled by the surveyed plaintiffs’ lawyers was 
modest—$45,500 in 2016 dollars.67 For those lawyers with half or 
more of their business in automobile accident cases, the median 
award in 2016 dollars was just $24,000.68 In contrast, for those with 
half or more or their business in medical malpractice and nursing 
home cases the median award in 2016 dollars was $359,000.69 
These differences highlight specialization within the plaintiffs’ bar 
itself, as does the fact that there is a clear hierarchy within this group 
based on the value and nature of cases handled. At the top are those 
who specialize in complex, high-cost, and high-risk cases, like 
medical malpractice. At the other end are the plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
 
63 For our survey respondents, the mean number of open cases was seventy-one and the 
median was twenty-five. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. On average, just 
over one-third of their caseloads were lower-value automobile accident cases. Id. 
64 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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specialize in low-complexity, lower-value, lower-cost, and lower-risk 
cases.70 This hierarchy is important for how the high-end specialists 
acquire their cases. 
The predominant source of clients for all of our survey respondents 
was some form of referral—just under three-quarters of their 
clients.71 Referrals from other lawyers were the most important 
(referrals from former clients were next); this reflects their status as 
specialists and their willingness to pay referral fees (in the form 
allowed) to the lawyers who refer cases to them. One younger, solo 
practitioner said, “as a solo, . . . most of my PI cases are referrals from 
other lawyers and referrals from friends, you know, like, lawyers that 
don’t do PI.”72 Personal injury cases generally dominate the referral 
market among Texas private practice lawyers, with medical 
malpractice cases being the most referred type of case. 
There has long been a robust referral system in Texas, and it is 
based on professional reputation. For lawyers in our 2006 survey, 
reputation is by far the most important reason for choosing a lawyer 
to whom to refer a case.73 This is especially important for those 
lawyers whose practices focus on complex, high-cost, and high-stakes 
cases like medical malpractice. This kind of specialization and 
referrals go hand in hand. For the lawyers in the survey with half or 
more of their business in medical malpractice—the super 
specialists—fifty-eight percent of cases came from lawyer referrals.74 
To be successful as a high-end specialist, there must be a way for 
cases of a certain kind to get to that lawyer. The typical client will 
likely not know who the appropriate specialists are, but other lawyers 
will. As one sole practitioner put it, “there’s the handful of kind of 
heavy hitter guys, that, you know . . . that live on the referrals . . . the 
smaller fish will get a case that’s over their head and kick it to those 
 
70 See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 141–75. 
71 In contrast, advertising—despite its apparent ubiquitous nature—was not a 
substantial source of business for the lawyers in our survey. Only fifteen percent of the 
caseload for those lawyers came from advertising. See id. at 152–53. Any larger scale 
advertising, such as television, is relatively rare. Most plaintiffs’ lawyers do not advertise 
on television if for no other reason than the expense for a practice built on the contingency 
fee. 
72 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
73 Data from the Texas Referral Practices Survey shows professional reputation is also 
the most important factor for all private practitioners in Texas when it comes to referring a 
case. See STATE BAR OF TEX., supra note 61. See also DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, 
at 190. 
74 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
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guys . . . they don’t really have significant advertising to speak of. It’s 
more their reputation.”75 Importantly, those smaller fish will receive a 
fee if the heavy hitter is successful, and this can be an important 
addition to their income from a more modest practice. The damage 
cap, then, can have a trickledown effect on referring lawyers if 
specialists are handling fewer cases. 
At the time of the interview, that solo practitioner just quoted said 
with regard to a medical malpractice case, “I’ve got one that we’re 
looking at, that if there’s something there, then of course, I’ll refer it 
to . . . one of the bigger boys in town.”76 From a lawyer who receives 
referral from other lawyers, “a referral basis that’s grounded in 
something that you earned—the right to be one of the go-to 
lawyers.”77 These complimentary comments tell us that specialization 
and referrals among lawyers are both important for meaningful 
access. It is about getting cases to the lawyers best able to handle 
them.78 
For plaintiffs’ lawyers, a referral system makes sense. The 
referring lawyer has a way of balancing risk, cost, and return, while 
better serving the client’s needs. In referring a case, this lawyer 
carries little or no risk for a case in which he or she does not have the 
expertise or resources to handle. If the specialist is successful, the 
referring lawyer will receive a percentage of the fee. The specialist 
carries the ultimate risk but is better able to ultimately handle it 
because of his or her expertise and resources. In addition, the 
referring lawyer who sees the case in the first instance will have done 
some initial screening. This saves the specialist both time and cost. 
A damage cap, especially a low one, disrupts this process of getting 
clients to the lawyers best able to handle their cases for the simple 
reason that the referred-to lawyer has less of a fee to share. It is one 
more key cost to take into consideration in deciding whether to take a 
particular case in light of possible award or settlement. This assumes, 
of course, the specialist is still taking cases. Access, in other words, is 
another trickle down effect of damage caps. 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Although we will not discuss it here, it is important to note that there was a concerted 
effort by the Texas Supreme Court to fundamentally alter the referral system in the early 
2000s, but that effort fell short. Some changes were made in 2005 that still left the system 
intact. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 55–65. 
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Regardless of how a case gets to a lawyer, case screening is 
everything and goes to the heart of the business model and the 
incentives in Governor Perry’s statement. A lawyer would likely go 
out of business if he or she blindly took on every, or even most, cases 
without consideration of risk, cost, and reward, regardless of how the 
cases came to the lawyer.79 And screening is not cheap if done right. 
It is all the more important in complex, high-cost cases like medical 
malpractice and all the more costly. To illustrate, one medical 
malpractice specialist told us, “last year we spent in excess of 
$100,000 in cases that we didn’t take.”80 
Even without damage caps, lawyers like this one take very few 
cases—the costs and risks are too great. Taking few cases can mean 
turning away cases in which liability is quite clear. With caps, 
especially if the limits are low in light of the costs, this is more likely. 
This could also mean turning away certain clients in cases with clear 
liability if the possible award is too small. Ultimately, damage caps 
will not allow for adequate compensation—enough to compensate the 
client, cover the lawyer’s costs, perhaps a referral fee, and the 
lawyer’s fee. 
For critics of caps like Professor Lucinda Finley, the concern is 
that lawyers will simply screen out certain types of people. She calls 
them the “hidden victims” of tort reform—injured people for whom 
noneconomic damages make up the bulk of the potential damages.81 
Finley, like Governor Perry, is interested in incentives and sees 
plaintiffs’ lawyers as rational actors focused on their own bottom line. 
Even if some lawyers continue to handle medical malpractice cases, 
those lawyers may decide to completely avoid these potential clients 
because of the limited reward. 
Finley’s worry adds another dimension to Hankinson and Baker’s 
more general concern about access. The logical consequence of caps 
will leave such people—those with little in the way of economic 
damages—“shut off from seeking redress and recognition through the 
 
79 On average the respondents to our 2006 survey reported signing twenty-five percent 
of the calls they received to a contingency fee contract. Even those with half or more of 
their business being automobile accident cases reported, on average, signing one-third of 
the calls. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible 
but Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 369 (2011). 
80 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
81 Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the 
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004). This same concern was a part of the reason the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a damage cap in medical malpractice cases in 
Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005). 
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tort system.”82 For Finley, limited access to redress is perhaps the 
most profound consequence of caps because it undermines “fairness 
and equality of our civil justice system.”83 
Finley’s worry also reinforces the importance of understanding the 
impact of damage caps on the business incentives underlying a 
plaintiffs’ contingency fee practice. Making decisions on what clients 
to take or not is where we see the connection between damage caps 
and meaningful access. To return to the comments of a lawyer quoted 
in this article’s introduction, “I wanna make sure that I’m clear about 
one thing, and that is the real victim in all of this (damage caps and 
tort reform generally) is the consumer, the individual . . . . It’s not the 
lawyers . . . we’re all fairly well educated and we’re resourceful 
enough to come up with other ways to pay our bills and feed our 
families. And although our styles may have taken a hit, we’re not the 
victims in this.”84 
IV 
CASE SCREENING AND DAMAGE CAPS: THE CHALLENGE FOR 
PLAINTIFFS’ LAWYERS IN THEIR WORDS 
The challenge of maintaining a steady stream of clients that the 
civil justice system will compensate adequately is substantial for all 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, but it is acute for lawyers handling medical 
malpractice cases where damage caps are imposed. Caps, as Governor 
Perry said (and Finley agrees), are clearly about changing the 
incentive structure for lawyers handling medical malpractice cases on 
a contingency fee basis. The best way to show what this means in 
practice is to simply let the research subjects speak for themselves. 
This is exactly what we will do here in exploring the screening 
process for capped cases. The lawyers’ comments about screening 
illustrate, in a very practical sense what is important, how the 
incentive structure underlying their business model works, and what 
some of the consequences of caps may be. 
Through our research, we learned that risk and cost are paramount 
in medical malpractice cases, even though the return on investment 
can be substantial. As one lawyer told us, “We all know that the 
hardest case to win is a med mal case at a trial because the juries just 
 
82 Finley, supra note 81, at 1313. 
83 Id. 
84 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
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don’t want to believe that doctors can make mistakes.”85 Another 
lawyer said, “Juries rarely award money on good medical malpractice 
cases, you know. They certainly don’t on frivolous ones. And on 
frivolous ones, you don’t even get to a jury. They get dismissed by 
summary judgment.”86 Put simply, plaintiffs are likely to lose medical 
malpractice cases that go to trial in Texas.87 This kind of risk 
illustrates why lawyerly expertise is so important, and it is the most 
skilled lawyers who are more likely to prevail for their clients.88 
These cases are especially expensive. A Houston medical 
malpractice specialist said, “there’s no other case in the system as 
expensive as malpractice.”89 The high costs involved in actually 
prosecuting a case enhance a lawyer’s risk since it is his or her money 
funding the case. One can deal with this risk, in the first instance, by 
rigorously screening the case. This screening is itself a substantial 
cost, which means the costs of screening must ultimately be covered 
by the cases taken, cases that are hopefully successful. In short, 
everything—not just profitability, but survival itself—is riding on the 
screening process. 
Accordingly, lawyers screen medical malpractice cases quite 
stringently. Our 2006 survey findings show that lawyers regularly 
handling medical malpractice cases (those for whom these cases 
comprise at least fifty percent of their business) take on average fewer 
than eight percent of the cases that come to them, and three-quarters 
reported taking ten percent or less.90 One-third reported taking as few 
as one percent or two percent. The figures are no different if we look 
at the lawyers for whom medical malpractice cases made up twenty-
five percent or more of their business.91 One specialist told us (in a 
precap interview) “[w]e’ve . . . always had statistics that go back 
 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Even in the years before Texas imposed the damage cap in medical malpractice cases 
in 2003, plaintiff win rates in medical malpractice cases tried to a jury were very low. For 
instance, for the years 1988 to 1990 the plaintiff win rate (defined as winning at least one 
dollar) was twenty-five percent or lower in Texas’ three largest jurisdictions: Harris 
County (Houston), Dallas County, and Bexar County (San Antonio). In comparison, the 
win rates for auto accidents cases during the same time period were no lower than forty-
eight. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF 
REFORM 80, tbl. 3.3, cont’d (1995). 
88 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 9, at 1057; Daniels et al., supra note 52; Hyman et 
al., supra note 53. 
89 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
90 DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 212. 
91 See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. 
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many, many years, maybe 10 or 15 years, that show that we look 
at 300 cases for every one we take. I think recently, within the 
last two years or at least year, that number has now gone to 
400.”92 
While screening in this practice area is done in different ways, all 
approaches emphasize the importance of the medical issues and then, 
if necessary, the costs of prosecuting the case. Reflecting the 
importance of the medical issues, some firms will have more 
specialized staff members that are important for screening purposes 
and eventually for case preparation. This specialized staff may 
include nurse-paralegals or nurse-lawyers or even a physician-lawyer. 
A medical malpractice specialist we interviewed in the 1990s (pre-
damage cap) outlined the composition of his staff: “we have nine 
lawyers that do almost nothing but medical malpractice. Two of our 
lawyers are doctor-lawyers; one is a nurse-lawyer; we have three 
nurse-paralegals.”93 
The specialist went on to explain the multiple steps in his firm’s 
screening process used in deciding whether to take the case that 
involved different levels of expertise within the firm, each examining 
the medical records. Some in the firm are responsible for consulting 
experts and the medical literature. Others conduct a thorough 
consideration of damages, venue, and the cost of moving forward. A 
regular firm meeting will eventually discuss potential cases—both the 
medical and legal aspects. He said, “Only if we agree on all of that 
and basically . . . everybody in the room reaches agreement, do we 
then decide we’re going to then get the client in and sign the client 
up.”94 
Another specialist, the one quoted above from a precap interview 
and who said “we look at 300 cases for every one we take,”95 
handled things without a large, specialized staff and is somewhat 
more typical.  
There’s three full-time lawyers . . . we have a lot of contract folks 
who we’ve developed relationships [with] over the years who have 
enabled us to keep the overhead very low . . . we have a nurse and a 
doctor on staff. Then we have other doctors that consult with us, 
almost on staff but technically not.96 
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As to screening, priority is given to the medical side. 
When we get a person who is a potential candidate, they talk to a 
receptionist. From there they go to an investigator. From there, if the 
answer is still yes or maybe, they go to a nurse, and from there, if it’s 
yes or maybe they go to a doctor. Only when the case is accepted . . . 
and if there are any issues on damages or things like that then I do 
get involved. But typically I only get involved in the cases that are 
actually signed up.97 
Medical issues always predominate and if the medical issues pass 
muster, the process turns to assessing the likely costs of handling the 
case. The possible return from the case must be sufficient to cover the 
costs of appropriately preparing the case and screening medical 
issues. For instance, one lawyer who specializes in brain injury cases 
said, “we always escrow $300,000 for each case.”98 
Another specialist, interviewed in the mid-1990s (and quoted 
earlier), provides an idea of how high the costs can get when you 
actually go to trial: “I think the most I’ve had was around $600,000 or 
$700,000. We prevailed on that one, thank goodness.”99 More typical 
is the lawyer who said, “you’re talking about $100,000 that you’re 
gonna [sic] spend on technical expertise to write reports, to give 
depositions, you know, to explain the standard of care and how it’s 
been breached.”100 
A lawyer interviewed in 2006 (postcap) described the process for 
nursing home cases at his firm before the Texas damage cap went into 
effect. His description gives a breakdown of the kinds of costs 
involved: 
In the old days, what I was looking for, my ideal case was a very 
longstanding nursing home stay, a protracted stay with multiple 
instances of neglect and possibly abuse—physical, sexual, 
emotional abuse. But what I was looking for were long periods of 
neglect. Because of the long periods of neglect, the neglect was 
crossing various medical specialties. And so I might have 
malnutrition, dehydration, decubitus ulcers, falls. And so I would 
need an expert witness then on each of those areas. And then I 
would also do a very extensive staffing analysis because poor 
staffing is highly correlated with poor care. And so I would have a 
staffing expert evaluate the staffing. I would then have a nursing 
home administrator expert to talk about the overall business aspect 
of the nursing home and how they’re emphasizing profits over 
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people. So all totaled, in the old days, I would routinely have eight 
to ten experts per case, would take 20 or 30 depositions, both 
liability depositions and corporate business type depositions, 
spending, you know, total investment in these nursing home cases, 
anywhere between $85,000 and $125,000 before they went to trial, 
all to achieve, though, multi-million dollar settlements. Okay? 
Those were the old days.101 
At that time—the old, precap days—the firm had a substantial 
nursing home and medical malpractice business. His staff 
included “another lawyer who was helping me with the docket. 
We each had secretaries. We each had paralegals and we then 
shared a nurse in addition to contract nurses that we 
employed.”102 
These examples above show that, even in the years before the 
damage cap went into effect, costs were substantial and the need 
for rigorous screening was great. Without exception, the lawyers 
we interviewed after 2003 (postcap) said the challenge of 
balancing risk, cost, and reward became even more daunting in 
these cases with the imposition of the cap. 
As one medical malpractice specialist put it, “The cost of 
prosecuting the case didn’t change when caps were instituted . . . . 
The only thing that changed was, now they’re capped at $250,000 
with regard to what frequently was the biggest element of damages, 
and it just made it where it was economically not feasible to take the 
cases.”103 He simply screens out cases in which noneconomic 
damages are the biggest element because the system will no longer 
compensate people in these cases adequately. 
Yet another lawyer emphasized that some cases passing muster on 
the medical issues would still be screened out. He said it is “no longer 
viable from a practical and business standpoint to be able to pursue so 
many of these cases that were still meritorious . . . given the 
anticipated expense and risk involved . . . given the caps and 
procedural and legal burdens imposed by tort reform.”104 In other 
words, the damage cap alters the incentive structure in a way that 
limits the availability of meaningful access even when it is warranted. 
The reason is simple: by limiting awards, damage caps function as a 
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limitation on the contingency fee, which is at the heart of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ business model. 
One lawyer summarized the postcap challenge quite succinctly. 
“You’re talking about a lot of money, and—in other words—it makes 
the juice not worth the squeeze.”105 This raises the question of 
whether the courthouse door is closing medical malpractice cases 
generally, and especially for people like Finley’s hidden victims. 
V 
ARE THE COURTHOUSE DOORS CLOSING? 
A. Once Again in the Lawyers’ Words 
For most lawyers, the only way to escape the challenge created by 
damage caps in trying to successfully balance cost, risk, and potential 
return is to make changes in their practices by avoiding the cases at 
the heart of that challenge—capped cases. Avoiding capped cases is, 
of course, precisely the response hoped for by the proponents of 
damage caps—especially if it’s the most skilled lawyers changing 
their practices. This would mean the courthouse doors would close, at 
least to some degree. In certain situations, as we will see in what 
lawyers told us about their practices in the postcap era, it could mean 
closing the doors all together in certain situations. 
One specialist told us about a major change in his practice in the 
face of the cap, one the proponents of caps would likely endorse.  
We are using cases out of the state to fit in with my desire to work on 
medical malpractice and nursing home cases, which is what our focus 
had been on in the past. And we got licensed in the State of Tennessee 
and handled a number of cases over there. We’re going to trial on a 
significant case in July in New Mexico.106 
Others, we discovered, are doing the same. “Out of state? Yes, I’ve 
got a case in the Bronx . . . I’ve got a malpractice case that I may file 
in California, I’ve got one . . . I’m looking at that may be filed in 
Oklahoma. So yeah, there are some cases, some of the cases that I 
normally would’ve filed in Texas. I’m filing outta state.”107 Another 
lawyer said, “I’ve got cases going on in two different states right now 
[South Dakota and Minnesota] . . . medical malpractice cases.”108 He 
is also considering getting licensed in another state. “I’ve seen 
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lawyers get—in fact, I can think of, just off the top of my head, I 
mean, right off the bat, three or four lawyers . . . that have gotten 
licensed in other states already.”109 
An interesting and somewhat similar practice change comes not 
from our interviews or surveys, but from the websites of some 
specialists. It is a business strategy of still handling some Texas cases 
subject to the damage cap along with medical malpractice cases 
elsewhere in the country. One firm, for instance, prominently notes on 
its website that it handles Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) cases. 
The website explains further: 
 Under United States tort law, federal employees are not 
personally liable for most torts they commit in the course of their 
work. Instead, the federal government provides an exclusive remedy 
for such tort claims called the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . The 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) removes the federal government’s 
immunity from certain types of tort claims and gives the 
government responsibilities much like those of a private citizen. 
This system allows citizens to file civil suits against the 
government.110 
The FTCA provides that the applicable law—for a matter like 
medical malpractice—is the law in the state in question (a damage 
cap applies only if the state has one). The FTCA also provides for the 
payment of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees of twenty percent 
or twenty-five percent (depending on whether a trial is involved or 
not) in successful medical malpractice cases.111 
These examples show that even if plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas 
continue to work in this practice area, they are looking for market 
niches elsewhere in which they can take advantage of their skills and 
expertise. In doing so, they diminish the availability of top-notch legal 
representation in Texas. 
Other lawyers are substantially cutting down the amount of 
medical malpractice and nursing home cases and reorienting their 
 
109 Id. 
110 National Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Cases, WHITEHURST, HARKNESS, BREES, 
CHENG, ALSAFFAR & HIGGINBOTHAM, PLLC, https://nationaltriallaw.com/federal-tort      
-claim-attorney/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). This firm is by no means alone in Texas in 
practicing in this market niche. See ARCHULETA LAW FIRM, http://www.veterans 
medicalmalpractice.net (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); THE LAW OFFS. OF TYLER & PEERY, 
http://www.tylerandpeery.com/Contact.shtml (last visited Dec. 21, 2017), among many 
others. Texas lawyers are not unique in focusing on this market niche. See, e.g., CHALAT 
LAW, http://www.chalatlaw.com/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); About Us, THE MCMILLEN 
LAW FIRM, https://federal-tort-claims.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
111 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (2017). 
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practices. One lawyer told us his postcap practice is “probably half 
now commercial litigation and half brain damage in medical 
malpractice . . . used to be the percentage was much, much higher in 
medical malpractice and all of our medical malpractice business has 
been concentrated on brain damage cases.”112 
When we interviewed this lawyer in the 1990s (precap), he said his 
practice was almost exclusively medical malpractice. As to why his 
practice changed: “I would say its 100% as a result of HB4”113 (the 
cap legislation). All of the commercial litigation is done on a 
contingency basis. 
A key part of our interviews was asking lawyers what type of 
medical malpractice case, if any, might still be viable from a business 
perspective. Without prompting, one thing we heard over and over in 
response to this question was about the people like Finley’s hidden 
victims and how the changed incentive system affected them. One 
lawyer said the 2003 damage cap “has the effect of eliminating an 
entire couple of subgroups of patients . . . those being individuals 
without any type of income and . . . children.”114 
The lawyer quoted in the previous section who spoke about his 
practice in the “old days”115—the precap days—gave us a more 
detailed illustration of what is a viable case from a business 
perspective and why. 
Those were the old days (precap). The new days . . . if a case comes 
in the door to me that is a protracted nursing home stay, which is a 
lot of things that went wrong, I know right off the bat that I can’t 
handle that case. It’s too expensive. If there is a . . . if $250,000 is 
the worst day in court for a nursing home, they’ll never settle for 
$250,000. But even if they did settle for or I did obtain a verdict for 
$250,000, the forty percent attorney’s fees would be $100,000 and 
in the old days, my expenses would be another $100,000. And then 
the Medicare and Medicaid lien reimbursements would easily be 
$50,000 on a very protracted course of negligence. And so now 
there’s nothing left. So what’s it been about? It’s been about me and 
the government reimbursement. And that’s not justice.116 
After the caps went into effect his firm closed the medical 
malpractice part of its business. The lawyer now works as a solo 
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practitioner still doing medical malpractice and nursing home cases, 
but not like the old days. As he described it: 
Now, I am a solo practitioner . . . I can’t tell you how sharp my 
pencil is in running this practice. And the only way that I’m able to 
make this work is I really, really, really pay attention to the number 
. . . so today what I’m looking for in terms of a case that comes in 
the door is a very clear-cut instance of negligence. Someone who 
chokes on a hot dog at dinner time who is supposed to be on a 
pureed diet but they’ve given him a hot dog and he chokes on the 
hot dog. They mess up the Heimlich maneuver and he dies right 
then and there from choking in the nursing home. I actually have 
that case, a clear-cut case.117 
He now simply avoids the more serious cases that defined his 
practice in the old days. 
Like this lawyer, others also made comparisons to the past in 
responding to our question about what kinds of cases may still be 
viable. One mentioned the example of a precap case he had 
successfully handled that he would turn away postcap. It involved a 
woman who had a breast removed that turned out not be cancerous. 
He stated the following: 
Before tort reform, I had a case of a woman that had a lump in her 
breast. She went to the surgeon . . . the surgeon decides he’s going 
to do a frozen section. He’s going to do a frozen section before he 
goes any further . . . Patient’s asleep. He forgets to do the frozen 
section and removes her breast . . . Now, the pathologist comes and 
says, “Guess what? That was benign tissue.” So you’ve got a case. 
Now, I settled that case for a $1.2 or a $1.3 million before tort 
reform. I had no economic damages at all. Zero. That case now . . . 
that case now is worth a maximum of $250,000. But, you know, 
there is no way you’re going to get 100 cents on the dollar.118 
Again, the central idea conveyed in this statement is that adequate 
compensation is not possible. 
The elderly, as the “old days/new days” lawyer’s comments 
show, have become especially unattractive. On the viability of 
cases involving an elderly person, one lawyer simply said, “you 
know, if you’re an old person and you’ve been a victim of medical 
malpractice . . . . You can’t bring the case, because you don’t have 
any lost earnings and your pain and suffering is capped.”119 The same 
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is true for children and anyone else without substantial economic 
damages. 
In telling us about the viability of cases involving a child, one 
lawyer drew from a case he did not take saying: 
But you know, that case was worth nothing, because that child is 
worth nothing. I mean, that’s the clearest cut example that we’ve 
experienced. This family comes in . . . [and] we can’t even hire an 
expert for you to tell you that this was negligent or not. Certainly 
sounds like negligence; I mean, you went in and had a surgery and 
something horrifically wrong happens. And we can’t even take it as 
a case, because your child didn’t have any earning capacity.120 
The question of earning capacity more generally took on special 
importance for the lawyers we interviewed, and this adds still another 
dimension to the concerns of Hankinson, Baker, Finley about 
meaningful access. Typical was the lawyer who said, “the medical 
malpractice cases . . . we’ve done a fair amount of that here, and the 
caps on the damages have just about made it impossible to find a very 
good case that you know would justify the expense of pursuing. You 
know, unless they’re a high wage earner and that sort of thing.”121 
Another lawyer shared a common sentiment: 
If you take the average working class guy . . . say they’re thirty-five 
years old and they make $10 an hour, which is, I’m sure, probably 
an average wage in Texas for working folks, blue collar folks . . . 
And if you’re capped on your emotional anguish damages, you 
know, you have extraordinary expenses related to litigation, 
catastrophic litigation, then you really hafta weigh whether or not, 
you know, you’re gonna take that case.122 
Another specialist, whose precap practice was dominated by 
medical malpractice and nursing home cases (ninety percent), shared 
his perspective on the viability of such cases: 
You’ve got to really be able to create some loss of earning capacity 
model to justify potential recovery outside of simply, you know, the 
intangible damages . . . the CEO of a Fortune 500 company who 
gets hurt in a medical malpractice case, well, you’re gonna be able 
to take his case. But it’s the hard worker . . . you can’t take their 
cases . . . they essentially closed the courthouse door to the 
negligence that would kill a child, a housewife or an elderly person  
. . . and unless it’s drop-dead clear negligence that you can 
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prosecute with one or two experts, that’s just not a case that I think 
in Texas right now is a viable case.123 
B. Evidence Beyond the Words of Lawyers 
Having let our research subjects speak for themselves, how can we 
address the practical question of whether the courthouse doors may 
actually be closing? One way is to look at filings in Texas trial courts. 
While annual data on the number of medical malpractice filings for 
the entire State of Texas are unavailable prior to 2011, they are 
available from a number of sources for Harris County, which includes 
Houston. Houston is the most populous county in Texas, as well as 
the third most populous county in the United States.124 These figures 
can at least give us a sense of any changes in filings. 
Figure 1 presents data from those sources on medical malpractice 
filings in Harris County over time. The pattern in Figure 1 indicates 
that filings for medical malpractice lawsuits clearly and substantially 
declined in Harris County after the implementation of the 2003 cap. 
For the five years after the cap was put into place—2004 to 2008—
the average number of medical malpractice filings per year was 233, 
representing a forty-six percent drop from the annual average of 435 
filings that took place between 1997 and 2002. 
 
123 Id. 
124 The Texas Office of Court Administration collects annual data on court filings. It 
only breaks tort cases down into two categories: auto cases and non auto cases. However, 
data are available for Harris County’s trial courts of general jurisdiction from the Harris 
County District Clerk and the Harris County Justice Information Management System. See 
Terry Carter, Tort Reform, Texas Style: New Laws and Med-Mal Damage Caps Devastate 
Plaintiff and Defense Firms Alike, 92 A.B.A. J. 30 (2006). 
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Raw filing figures show fewer matters coming into the courts, but 
do they mean the courthouse doors are actually closing? One might 
presume the answer lies with the raw material—medical errors. 
However, there is no reason to think that medical errors suddenly and 
substantially declined. There is reason, as our discussion illustrates, to 
think the gatekeepers are a key part of the explanation. We designed 
part of our 2006 survey to discern whether the doors are closing 
because lawyers were actually avoiding these cases generally, or 
avoiding certain kinds of clients. To do so, we included an experiment 
of sorts. 
We asked respondents to the survey to indicate whether they would 
take cases with certain kinds of clients five years prior to the survey 
(precap), and whether they would take the same types of clients at the 
time of the survey (postcap). Rather than simply ask the survey 
respondents generally about clients and cases, greater analytic value 
was gained by presenting them with a series of questions based on 
hypothetical situations that would allow for controlled comparisons 
involving different combinations of cases and clients.125 
 
125 The hypotheticals follow the logic of a difference-in-differences design and were 
constructed with the assistance of ten experienced and successful Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers 
practicing in different parts of the state, chosen because of their reputations. Like all 
lawyers we interviewed, we promised complete confidentiality as required by regulations 
governing human subjects research. See generally Daniels & Martin, supra note 10. See 
also DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 216–20. 
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The hypothetical situations posed in the survey involved the 
following: 
1. Three kinds of potential plaintiffs: (1) a seventy-year-old retired 
male for whom economic damages would be minimal; (2) a forty-
five-year-old employed, married male for whom there could be 
significant economic damages (the ideal client representing 
medical malpractice cases generally); and (3) a forty-five-year-old 
married “stay-at-home mom” for whom economic damages would 
be present but low. 
2. The same injury unquestionably caused in one of two ways: (1) 
by a physician in a medical malpractice case; (2) or by an eighteen-
wheeler in a car wreck case—that involved substantial 
noneconomic injury (cases involving eighteen-wheelers are highly 
sought after);126 and 
3. Two time periods: (1) five years prior to the 2006 survey 
(precaps); and (2) at the time of the survey (postcap). 
For each client-case situation (e.g., seventy-year old male in a 
medical malpractice case) at each point in time (e.g., the same client-
case situation precap and postcap), respondents were asked the 
following: whether they would take the case, take it but refer it to 
another lawyer, or not take the case at all. The possibility of referring 
the case was included in order to present the respondents with a 
realistic set of choices.127 We wanted to know if the attractiveness of 
certain clients in medical malpractice cases—or malpractice cases 
generally—became diminished in the wake of the Texas damage cap. 
The underlying explanation for the disparity is the change in lawyers’ 
incentive structure—a direct result of the damage cap. 
Figure 2 summarizes the salient results from these questions in the 
2006 survey; the bars represent the percentage of lawyers who found 
the client type “attractive” in each situation. The “attractiveness” 
 
126 Such cases have the potential for substantial settlements and awards. More 
importantly, juries seem more amenable towards them compared to medical malpractice 
cases. “Everybody seems to be able to connect with an 18-wheeler that’s out of control. 
You know, we hit one for $20 million that we got paid on, and you know, even 
Republicans were voting for us on that one,” said a Houston lawyer. See generally Daniels 
& Martin, supra note 10. 
127 Much more detailed and technical descriptions of this part of our 2006 survey can 
be found in two of our earlier pieces, Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It is No Longer 
Viable from a Practical and Business Standpoint: Damage Caps, ‘Hidden Victims,’ and 
the Declining Interest in Medical Malpractice Cases, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 59 (2010); 
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 14, at 216–28. 
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measure includes the percentage of responding lawyers who would 
have taken or referred clients in each of the case types. We combined 
the two possibilities because we know medical malpractice cases are 
frequently referred and because many specialists rely on referrals for 
cases. Before referring a case, a lawyer must do some initial screening 
knowing there would be specialists out there looking for referred 
cases. 
 
With regard to the question of attractiveness, Figure 2 shows the 
following from all respondents to the 2006 survey: 
1. Medical malpractice cases were generally attractive before the 
cap as shown by the high percentages of attractiveness for each 
type of client on bar Malpractice 2001 in Figure 2; 
2. Clients with limited economic damage potential—the 70 Year-
Old Male and the 45 Year-Old Female—were quite attractive at 
both points in time in 18-wheeler cases as shown on bars 18-
Wheeler 2001 and 18-Wheeler 2006; 
3. Those same clients with limited economic damage potential 
were attractive in medical malpractice cases before the cap as 
shown on bar Malpractice 2001; 
4. But those clients became significantly less attractive in medical 
malpractice cases after the cap as seen by comparing bars 
Malpractice 2001 and Malpractice 2006; 
95%
89% 87%
28%
96% 95% 93%
69%
95% 93% 93%
37%
18 Wheeler 2001 18 Wheeler 2006 Malpractice 2001 Malpractice 2006
Figure 2
Attractiveness of Client by Case Type in Light of 
Texas $250,000 Noneconomic Damage Cap
70 Year‐Old Male 45 Year‐Old Male 45 Year‐old Female
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5. However, there is no comparable change for the limited damage 
clients in the 18-wheeler cases as seen by comparing bars 18-
Wheeler 2001 and 18-Wheeler 2006; and 
6. Importantly, even the “best” client became less attractive in 
medical malpractice cases postcap, but not to the same degree as 
the other client types as seen by comparing the percentages for 45 
Year-Old Male (representing medical malpractice cases in general) 
in bars Malpractice 2001 and Malpractice 2006. 
The lawyers’ responses summarized in Figure 2 reflect a 
fundamental change in the attractiveness of medical malpractice 
matters generally, but especially those involving hidden victims. The 
changes give credence to the comments of the lawyers we interviewed 
and discussed earlier. Still, it is possible to read the results from the 
survey’s hypotheticals with a skeptical eye and assume that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ responses were guided more by their political opposition to 
caps than by actual changes in their approach to certain kinds of 
clients and to medical malpractice cases. 
However, responses to other questions from the 2006 survey were 
unlikely to be guided by political views, and they reinforce the 
findings drawn from the hypotheticals. The survey asked lawyers to 
indicate the distribution of their caseload by percentage across twenty 
substantive areas relevant to plaintiffs’ practice. When asked about 
their caseload mix in the 2006 survey, just over one-half of the 460 
respondents (250, or fifty-four percent) reported handling the same 
amount of medical malpractice as five years earlier (before the 2003 
cap). Most of these 250 respondents, however, (211) handled no 
malpractice at either point in time. If we remove from our analysis the 
211 respondents who reported not being in the medical malpractice 
market at either point in time, sixteen percent of the remaining 249 
respondents reported doing the same amount of medical malpractice, 
twenty-four percent reported doing more, and sixty-one percent 
reported doing less. 
Perhaps illustrating the point even more clearly, are the responses 
from the 163 lawyers who completed both of our surveys—the 2000 
survey and the 2006 survey (we noted these “repeaters” earlier in the 
article in outlining our Texas research). Like the 2006 survey, the 
2000 survey asked lawyers to indicate the distribution of their 
caseload by percentage across those twenty substantive areas. 
Because the surveys were done six years apart and each used the same 
list of substantive areas, we can compare the responses of those 163 
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lawyers regarding their caseload mix at the time of each survey and 
look for changes in mix of business. Doing so greatly minimizes the 
possibility that responses are driven by political opposition to damage 
caps in medical malpractice cases or other particular tort reform 
measures. 
A comparison of individual responses for these 163 repeaters in 
each survey regarding the percentage of caseload comprised of 
medical malpractice revealed that 57 reported handling no medical 
malpractice at the time of either survey. For the 106 lawyers who 
included some medical malpractice matters in their caseloads, twelve 
percent of them reported no change in the percentage of business 
made up by medical malpractice, twenty-seven percent reported an 
increase, and sixty percent reported a decrease. In short, medical 
malpractice itself became less attractive to this set of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers after the implementation of damage caps. 
The additional evidence from our surveys coincides with the 
responses to the hypotheticals showed about the attractiveness of 
medical malpractice cases after the implementation of the 2003 cap. 
The survey’s findings are also consistent with the information 
presented above in Figure 1, which shows the decline of filings for 
medical malpractice cases in Harris County, Texas, trial courts. 
Finally, our survey findings are also consistent with the findings of 
a study of closed medical malpractice insurance claims in light of the 
2003 damage caps. Using publicly available data from the Texas 
Department of Insurance, the study found that closed medical 
malpractice claims and payouts per claim for Texas declined after the 
2003 cap went into effect. The declines, according to this study, 
affected medical malpractice claims generally but were especially 
acute for the elderly.128 More specifically, 
 The 2003 tort reforms had a dramatic impact on claim rates and 
payouts per claim. We expected the impact to be larger for elderly 
plaintiffs, because a higher proportion of their damages are non-
economic. We find evidence consistent with that expectation. There 
is evidence of a steeper drop in claim rates for the elderly, 
especially the very elderly. We also find a larger drop in per-claim 
payouts for the elderly . . . .129 
 
128 Myungho Paik et al., How Do the Elderly Fare in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 
Before and After Tort Reform? Evidence from Texas, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 561, 580 
(2012). 
129 Id. at 595. 
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CONCLUSION 
We opened our discussion with a quote from former Texas 
governor Rick Perry that came from his signing statement for the 
2003 legislation that imposed a damage cap on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice and nursing home cases. In his statement, he 
boasted about changing the incentive structure for plaintiffs’ lawyers 
handling these matters. Our research indicates—in light of the 
contingency fee business model—the legislation did just that, with 
very real implications for meaningful access to the rights and 
remedies the law provides. 
As we emphasized, meaningful access requires an experienced 
lawyer able to handle and finance a case. This is especially true for a 
complex, expensive, high-risk case such as medical malpractice. 
Meaningful access is not free. For most plaintiffs, an opportunity to 
pursue a remedy requires a lawyer who will handle the case on a 
contingency fee basis. What Governor Perry was celebrating in 
pointing to a change in incentives is that damage caps dramatically 
reduce the viability of legitimate medical malpractice and nursing 
home cases. Especially problematic in all of this are the hidden 
victims—those without substantial economic damages—for whom 
access is curtailed the most. Their situation makes any claimed quid 
pro quo justified by the claimed benefits of damage caps to society 
generally—as alluded to in Horton—quite troubling.130 
Without lawyers willing and able to take these cases, all that is left 
is formal access with little hope for an actual remedy. And while we 
have focused on medical malpractice and the effects of damage caps 
in Texas, the general idea regarding the relationship between damage 
caps and incentives applies more generally to other contingency fee 
situations. Meaningful access for plaintiffs will depend on whether 
lawyers can successfully find a steady stream of clients the civil 
justice system will compensate adequately by compensating the 
client, covering the lawyer’s costs, and providing a reasonable fee for 
the lawyer. 
In sum, it is the detrimental effect of damage caps on meaningful 
access that is most important for Oregon to consider moving forward. 
The lesson from Texas—“it’s the incentives, stupid.”131 
  
 
130 See cases cited supra note 48. 
131 David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort 
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2006). 
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